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SEPT

10° CONFERENCIA LATINOAMERICANA DE SEGURIDAD DE PROCESOS DEL CCPS





Center for Chemical Process Safety

Barranquilla 2024Colombia








UNCOVERING **HIDDEN RISKS: IDENTIFYING &** ADDRESSING SYSTEMATIC FAILURES **IN SAFETY SYSTEMS**

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FAILURE TYPES

SIL Safety Integrity Level	RANDOM		SYSTEMATIC
	FAILURES		FAILURES
HFT Hardware Fault Tolerance	•Hardware Wear & Tear	IMPACT ON SYSTEM	•Design Flaws
SC Systematic Capability	 Environmental Factors Unpredictable Events Over-Stressed Equipmen 	RELIABILITY	 Human Error Procedural Gaps Software Bugs
PTP Proof Test Procedures	•Human Error		Human BehaviorCommon Cause



PSM Process Safety Management

FSM Functional Safety Management

FSA Functional Safety Assessments







RANDOM FAILURES VS. SYSTEMATIC FAILURES

SYSTEMATIC: FEWER BUT WITH A MORE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT



RANDOM: NUMEROUS BUT GENERALLY LOWER IN IMPACT

RANDOM








HSE PRIMARY CAUSE BY PHASE








Specification 44%





FSA TIMING vs. DESIGN CHANGE COSTS







FSA REQUIREMENTS AT EACH STAGE

	FSA 1	1 Checklist: Hazard and Risk Analysis Independence and Risk Reduction Limits Review							
	ltem No	Item							
	1.1	The value assumed in the H&RA for the frequency of dangerous process control (a.k.a., BPCS) failures as the initiating source of a hazardous event is consistent with the limits in clause 8							
	1.2	The as FSA 2 Checklist: Safety System Detailed Design Review							
	1.3 1.4	Use of Hazarc	ltem No						
	1.4	The fu		Recommendations from FSA stage 1 have been satisfactorily addressed					
		• s •	2.2	Reliab audita FSA 3 Checklist: Functional safety portion of PSSR					
	4.5	• † • •	2.3	SRS is	ltem No	Item			
	1.5	• t	• t	Suffic	3.1	Recommendations from FSA stages 1 and 2 are satisfactorily addressed			
		 r f fun 	2.4	confir Quant	2.2	Verification of the safety system logic solver configuration, programming, and the functions therein (e.g., FAT) was complet documented in alignment with clauses 12 and 13 requirements if not previously performed as input to FSA 2 (see above).			
		*A sub Each i	2.5	Quant 3.2 depen SIL ve		Any defects found during verification have been corrected, or compensating measures have been put in place to address an estimated risk reduction			
	1.6	the los OR Co	he lo: 2.6	a) b) ,	3.3	Verification of the safety system devices (e.g., logic solver, auxiliary system, and instrument loop commissioning) was comp documented in alignment with clause 14 requirements			
	1.7	mitiga Total i	2.7	c) Desigi	5.5	Any defects found during verification have been corrected or compensating measures have been put in place to address any estimated risk reduction			
	\frown	within SRS ar	2.8	interv Specil	3.4	Validation of the safety system(s) and the functions therein (e.g., SAT, end-to-end function testing) was completed and doc alignment with clause 15 requirements.			
	1.8	2	2.9	Opera		Any defects found during validation have been corrected or compensating measures have been put in place to address any or estimated risk reduction			
	1.9	P&ID (Functi	2.10	PSI dc	3.5	Specified security countermeasure verification was completed and documented			
	1.10	• (Verifi		All defects found during security countermeasure verification have been corrected			
		• r Initial	r 2.11	docun		As-built updates have been made to H&RA, SRS, PSI documentation and procedures after correction of verification and valid			
	1.11	countermeasures have		Any d res hav	3.7	H&RA, SRS, and PSI documents with as-built updates remain consistent with each other and still adhere to the clause 8-12 r Safety system operating procedures (e.g., bypass, alarm response, compensating measures) and other required documentat			
				3.8	3.8	created			
SOURCE: ISA-TR84.00.04-2020 3.9				3.9	Safety system maintenance procedures (e.g., preventive maintenance, inspection, proof test, on-line repair upon diagnosed been created				



***NOT REQUIRED**

***REQUIRED**



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FSA TEAM INDEPENDENCY & THE CYBERSECURITY CLAUSE



ANSI/ISA-61511-1:2018 Clause 5.2.6.1.2 requires at least one senior, <u>competent</u>, <u>independent</u> (from the work being assessed) person to take part in the FSA.



ANSI/ISA-61511-1:2018 Clause 8.2.4 A security risk assessment shall be carried out to identify the security vulnerabilities of the SIS.

SOURCE: ANSI/ISA-61511-1:2018










KEY TAKEAWAYS





POSE GREATER RISK!

IDENTIFY HIDDEN RISKS





